Washington

A Sadder and Wiser Young President

By JAMES RESTON

WASHINGTON, April 20-Presithe editors today is a mood of selfexamination and self-criticism.

In the first place, he is not looking. for scapegoats. He is taking full personal responsibility for the Government's part in the adventure, and this responsibility, of course, is great.

He took the decision to continue the training of the Cuban refugees with arms provided by the Government, and for releasing the ships and gasoline to launch the attack at this time!

He did so against the advice of Secretary of State Rusk and Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles. He did so on the basis of an intelligence estimate by the Central Intelligence Agency which was conyinced that Cuba was ripe for revolt.

Other intelligence estimates by the allies challenged the C. I. A.'s analysis, but Kennedy went along with the C. I. A. without arguing out the differences in the Cabinet or the National Security Council.

The Useful Lessons'

Publicly, the President said nothing today about errors committed here. He talked about the "useful lessons" of this "sobering episode," but he is drawing more lessons than he mentioned.

One of these is that the whole system of intelligence analysis within the Government must be Intelligence Agency is a vast organization with some 10,000 cmployes in Washington and several thousand more over has or outside the Federal capital.

The question naturally arises how it could be that this Apparatus, with all its access to Cuba and to friendly nations within the join where, could be so sure that the Clums would revolt, and be for wrang on the critical point of justiment.

Kennedy is not blaming Allen mate to Kennedy Fait he down with to know where they went wr and they are now tery maters as

STATINTL

The Kennedy system of re decisions of this nature is also very much under review. When he came dent Kennedy has taken the defeat into office, he questioned the usein Cuba with the utmost serious-rulness of the National Security ness. Behind his brave words to Council, which is a Cabinet committee, with its own staff, charged with making recommendations to the President on foreign and defense policy questions.

His view was that these Cabinet meetings were a waste of time, so that he has virtually dispensed with them and substituted instead a series of bilateral and ad hoc meetings with one or two Cabinet members or members of the White House staff.

This may or may not be an improvement on the old system but in any event, there is a feeling in some quarters here that the Cuban decision was not "staffed through" as well as it should have been before the decision was made to let it proceed. Whether this is a valid point is a matter of opinion, but the fact is that immediately after the Cuban failure, the President did call Cabinet meeting for this week and summoned the National Security Council to the White House next Baturday.


The Old Assumptions

Thus, he is ending his third month in office in anything but a dogmatic mood. Events have shaken many of the assumptions he brought into the White House both about the magnitude and complexity of his problems and the best procedures for meeting them.

His orbitidence in the direction of speedily reviewed. The Central the C. I. A. has clearly been shaken. and will ilmost certainly be changed. His rectitence in the effectiveness of the inter-American system to deal with Communist subversion in the fiemisphere has also been

she in and the Allies will be hearing shore from him on this in the
coaing weeks.

It there is nothing mournful or
the thous in his reaction. He acted
quitely and clearly to answer Nikita
Khrighchev's note this week. He surplimed the experts to the White He at 11 o'clock last night to ir hefore he went on the air. If har he is not denying his failbet he's trying to learn from



Approved For Release 2000/04/13: CIA-RDP70-00058R000200140223-7